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THE "DUE-ON-SALE" MORTGAGE CLAUSE AS
A METHOD OF RECONCILING THE COMPETING
INTERESTS OF LENDER AND BORROWER
BRENDA D. CROCKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mortgage law long has been conservative, steeped in the
common law and the traditions of the business world. Since
1976, however, significant changes have emerged in judicial
treatment of due-on-sale clauses and the acceleration of mort-
gage debt. Outlined by a trilogy of recent court decisions, the
emerging theory supports the due-on-sale clauses as a reason-
able business device, and seeks to restore socio-economic
balance within the residential mortgage industry. In tandem,
these decisions present a rational alternative to the demise of
the savings and loan industry.
A. The Trilogy
In February of 1968, First Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation of Charlotte, North Carolina, became the holder of an
$80,000 promissory note at seven percent.1 The note was
secured by a deed of trust on three apartment buildings and con-
tained a standard due-on-sale acceleration clause.2 In October of
1978 the debtor sold the property to Elizabeth Crockett, who ar-
ranged with First Federal to assume the seven percent loan.
Eleven years later, Ms. Crockett arranged to sell the property
to Mr. and Mrs. Proctor, pending First Federal's consent to
their assumption of the loan at seven percent. When First
* B.A., Agnes Scott College (1971); J.D., Washington & Lee University
(1980); Staff Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and should not be considered to
represent the views of the fourth circuit.
I Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 621, 224 S.E.2d
580, 582 (1976).
2 Id. at 621-22, 224 S.E.2d at 582. The due-on-sale clause provided in perti-
nent part:
[If the property herein conveyed is transferred without the written
assent of Association, then in all or any of said events the full principal
sum with all unpaid interest thereon shall at the option of Association,
its successors or assigns, become at once due and payable without fur-
ther notice and irrespective of the date of maturity expressed in said
note....
1
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Federal conditioned its consent on the Proctors' agreement to
pay the current market rate of nine and three-quarters percent,
Ms. Crockett and the Proctors brought suit to restrain First
Federal from accelerating the debt and sale of the property. The
trial court found for the mortgagor and denied First Federal ex-
ercise of the agreed upon provision. In the landmark decision of
Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,3 the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court and set
forth the rational modern approach to lender acceleration pur-
suant to a due-on-sale clause.
The Crockett court addressed each of the major substantive
theories on which American courts have relied when confronted
with a similar fact pattern. The breadth of its conclusions set
North Carolina as a leader in mortgage lending theory and es-
tablished what has become the national trend. Most importantly,
the court held that a standard due-on-sale clause is not a direct
restraint on alienation.' The court reasoned that such a clause
neither prevents the mortgagor from transferring the property
nor demands forfeiture upon the attempt.' The mortgagor is
free to sell whenever he locates a buyer to his liking. Moreover,
even if the clause were construed as an indirect restraint,' it
must be considered reasonable and thereby valid in comparison
to the traditionally approved indirect restraints having greater
practical effect on alienability
As a second reason for its decision, the court applied equity
theory and held that a mortgagor's unconsented to transfer
justifies acceleration even where the mortgagee's sole purpose
is to exact an increase in the loan rate.8 In view of escalating in-
Id. at 632, 224 S.E.2d at 588.
Id at 624-25, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
'Id. at 625, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
The Crockett court found that the "practical effect" of a due-on-sale clause
may be to hinder or indirectly restrain alienation. Id. at 625, 224 S.E.2d at 584.
The court adopted the definition of indirect restraints contained in L. SIMEs & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1112 (2d ed. 1956):
"An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish
some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental
result that the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical alienability."
Although the court failed to make a specific finding whether the due-on-sale
clause at issue was an indirect restraint, its result may indicate that it considered
the clause not to be an indirect restraint. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
' 289 N.C. at 628-31, 224 S.E.2d at 586-87.
' Id. at 629-30, 224 S.E.2d at 586-87.
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flation, such action constitutes a valid business purpose rather
than a penalty.9 Furthermore, since the mortgagor has the ad-
vantage of prepaying the loan when interest rates fall below his
loan rate, equity should spread the risks by providing the mort-
gagee the counterbalancing right to increase the rate when the
current market rate rises."0 Adding contract theory, the court
stated that the due-on-sale clause is a bargained-for provision
within a contract between parties of equal bargaining power.'
Absent proof of inequitable conduct, a court must refuse to
rewrite the agreement. 2
The Crockett court disagreed with those state courts which
consider acceleration to maintain a current portfolio inequitable
conduct, and which further require the mortgagee to show im-
pairment of his security to justify acceleration.1 3 Instead, the
Crockett court stated, a request for repayment of funds lent to a
mortgagor to finance the purchase of property is the exercise of
an express contractual right pursuant to a valid business pur-
pose." Because acceleration is not expressly conditioned upon
proof of impairment, and occurs only as a result of the mort-
gagor's conduct, the court held proof of impairment unreason-
ably burdensome.1
Expanding on these views in Occidental Savings & Loan
Association v. Venco Partnership, the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the standard due-on-sale clause is neither a direct nor
9 See id. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
10 Id. at 627, 224 S.E.2d at 585. The court also stated that in absence of a due-
on-sale clause, a mortgagor would receive a "fortuitous" premium from the sale of
his realty and the favorable assumption of his outstanding loan. The court sug-
gested that the due-on-sale clause, on the other hand, allows the mortgagor to
receive the fair market value of his property, but no more. Id. For discussion on
this point by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, see text accompanying notes
20-30 infra.
" Id. at 626-27, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
1 See id. at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
,3 Id. at 629-30, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
' Id. at 626-27, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
,5 See id. at 630, 224 S.E.2d at 587. The court rejected the argument that the
impairment requirement of U.C.C. § 1-208 provides a standard for the enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses. The court distinguished "insecurity clauses" subject
to § 1-208 from "default-type" clauses such as the due-on-sale clause at issue. Id.
at 631, 224 S.E.2d at 588; see U.C.C. § 1-208. The court noted that the right to ac-
celerate in a due-on-sale clause is conditioned upon conduct within the control of
the debtor, eliminating the need for imposing a good faith standard on the lender.
Id. at 631, 224 S.E.2d at 588.
1982]
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an indirect restraint on alienation." The court acknowledged
that lenders use the clause as "the main vehicle for increasing
interest rates when money is scarce" 7 and made two arguments
in its favor. Under the standard clause the terms plainly warn
the mortgagor that he has no right to transfer his loan rate with
the property.18 More importantly, however, public policy consi-
derations which favor lender solvency and disfavor judicial era-
dication of contractual obligations demand that the court allow
lending institutions to upgrade their portfolios. 9
Completing the trilogy in May of 1981, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explored the economic
implications of escalation in Williams v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association." Essentially, the court held that the mortga-
gee's use of a standard due-on-sale clause does not constitute a
restraint on alienation and that his exercise of the clause upon
unconsented to transfer constitutes reasonable business prac-
tice.2
The facts, as stated by the court, reveal that in 1977 the
Baileys purchased a home with a $55,000 thirty-year mortgage
at ten percent.' The loan was secured by a first deed of trust
with a standard due-on-sale clause,23 which First Federal sought
to exercise upon unconsented to transfer of the property in
1979.24 Judge Murnaghan, writing for the court, stated that the
interest rate at the time of transfer was approximately fifteen
percent.' Judge Murnaghan reasoned that to allow assumption
at ten percent would be to provide the mortgagor with "a dis-
tinct economic value," since [he] would be able to realize
"5 206 Neb. 469, 473-79, 293 N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (1980).
" Id. at 478, 293 N.W.2d at 848.
I Id.
z, Id. at 479-82, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
2 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). Three cases were consolidated for trial in the
district court. The fourth case presented to the Fourth Circuit was consolidated
with Williams on appeal. Id. at 912.
21 Id at 910.
Id. at 913.
' Id. at 914.
21 Id. at 916. The issue of what constitutes a transfer under the clause, which
was presented in this case, exceeds the scope of this article.
I Id. at 914. Judge Murnaghan further noted that although the face value of
the loan was $53,903.63, the actual value was $38,000, a discount of twenty-nine
percent. Id.
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more from the sale of [the] house than if [he] were forced to com-
ply with the due-on-sale clause. ' 26 Judge Murnaghan further
reasoned that in inflationary times the mortgagor who sells his
lower loan rate with his property reaps both his profit from the
real estate market and "artificial profit attributable to the
decline in value of the ... loan."' Noting further that the mort-
gagor is not the risk holder in a mortgage transaction, the court
refused to condone such a windfall." Moreover, the court deter-
mined in Williams that the mortgagee was "entitled to enforce
[its] due-on-sale clauses, for they are simply not restraints on
alienation."' The essence of the court's position was that "[i]t is
simply a misperception to eviscerate.... as a restraint on aliena-
tion, a clause that only precludes the homeowner from realizing
an additional and unbargained for economic advantage because
interest rates have risen since the time when he secured ... his
promise to repay what he borrowed."30
B. The Divided Remainder
In the last thirty years similar fact patterns have given rise
to a great many judicial decisions. Courts have applied four ana-
lytical approaches. These approaches include restraint on aliena-
tion theory, contract theory, equity theory, and the preemption
doctrine.
Id. at 915.
= Id. at 915 n.8.
SId.
Id. at 926. See also n.29, citing with approval Occidental Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980). The court
reasoned that:
the due-on-sale clause does not preclude, forbid, or deter sale of the
property free and clear at any time. It concerns instead only the time
when the borrower must pay his obligation. It could hardly be seriously
contended that, if a loan secured by a deed of trust to provide funds to
purchase a house were, from the outset payable on demand, it would
amount to an unreasonable restraint of alienation.... [Plaintiffs] seek to
convert an advantage obtained by them when they first borrowed to
buy the house, which there was no legal obligation for the lender to pro-
vide, into an even greater advantage.
What ... [they] argue is that, when they acquired the property,
they should have been granted a better deal, allowing full rights to
maintain the full 30 year term status of the loan, despite a change in the
home ownership.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 924 n.29.
19821
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The majority of courts that have applied restraint theory
agree that the due-on-sale clause. is not an invalid restraint on
alienation if its exercise is reasonable. In many of these jurisdic-
tions, reasonableness turns on whether the mortgagee can show
that transfer to a particular buyer impairs the value of his
security.3'
Courts which apply contract theory agree that the due-on-
sale clause is no more than a bargained-for term in a contract,
which should not be ignored absent proof of unconscionable or
inequitable conduct on the part of the mortgagee. Under the cur-
rent trend, these courts uphold the mortgagee in his refusal to
consent to transfer unless the buyer will agree to pay the pre-
vailing market interest rate. The rationale is that the mortgagor
and the mortgagee were the only parties to the contract, and
that the mortgagor and a stranger to the contract should not be
allowed to profit by a rising interest market at the expense of
the mortgagee's solvency. Consequently, the mortgagee can
meet his burden by showing both a transfer without consent and
a current market rate in excess of the original loan rate.2
Courts which base their decisions on equity theory draw
heavily from the reasonableness theory or the contract theory. 3
Courts using the preemption doctrine, on the other hand, usu-
ally refrain from the first three theories. Instead, they find that
federal law governing thrift institutions preempts state law;
they apply federal regulations which support the mortgagee's
exercise of the clause to maintain a current portfolio.3
This article has two purposes. The first is to illustrate the
dilemma economic conditions and judicial rigidity pose currently
for residential real estate mortgagees. The second is to encour-
age a judicial approach in keeping with Crockett, Occidental,
and Williams. The ultimate conclusion is that only by reevaluat-
ing their historical response to the rights and duties involved in
residential mortgages can the courts achieve a rational balance
between the interests of the mortgagor and mortgagee.
3, See text accompanying notes 65-72 infra.
See text accompanying notes 187-230 infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 231-86 infra.
34 Id.
[Vol. 84
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II. THE PROBLEM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE
THRIFT INSTITUTION
Thrift institutions have grown in number at an unprece-
dented rate since World War II." During this same period, and
especially since the mid-1960's, the American economy has ex-
perienced escalating inflation.3 6 Currently, thrift institutions
dominate the residential money market." To withstand the enor-
mous pressure of competition and escalating inflation, these in-
stitutions have attempted to devise efficient short and long
term lending policies. To be efficient these policies must of
course promote solvency.
During periods of diminishing or low level inflation, thrift in-
stitutions concentrated their policy-making efforts on combat-
ting competition within the industry s They can afford to offer
mortgage packages designed to increase their share of the
market for several reasons. The cost of money is low in compari-
son to the cost in periods of escalating inflation. Investors are
attracted to their longer term moderate yield securities. More-
over, loan prepayments tend to increase, since many obligors
can obtain money at a rate lower than their original loan rate. 9
As a result of these factors, thrift institutions have available a
larger number of dollars to invest in the mortgage market.
By contrast, in periods of higher or escalating inflation,
thrift institutions generally find themselves locked into the bar-
gain packages they offered when money was cheaper. When the
I By the end of 1972, there were 5,317 thrift institutions competing in the
mortgage money market. See Stafford, 1972 Statistical Report for Savings
Associations, 173 SAVINGS AND LOAN ANNALS 250, 251-55 (1974).
See Appendix, Chart 1.
In 1977, thrift institutions held approximately $383.05 billion in 1-4 member
family real estate debt, whereas commercial banks held $105.11 billion and FHA
held approximately $11.39 billion. FEDERAL RES. BULL., Chart A41 (May 1980). By
the close of 1979, thrift institutions held approximately $473.35 billion, commer-
cial banks approximately $146.07 billion, and FHA approximately $14.88 billion.
See generally L. KANDALL, THE SAVINGS AND LOAN BUSINESS (1962).
u The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Mark Sauers, Presi-
dent of the Savings & Loan League, for the compilation of facts appearing in this
section, and for the development of some of the ideas appearing herein.
S R. FISHER, MORTGAGE REPAYMENTS As A SOURCE OF LOANABLE FUNDS [Sic]
at 15-16, chart 4-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FISHER].
1982]
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current market interest rates are high, the rate previously
charged for mortgage money, and the effective rate of return on
these mortgage dollars, no longer yields a reasonable profit."
Money becomes more expensive. Total deposits drop or increase
at a lower rate, as investors make substantial withdrawals in
search of shorter term high-yield securities.' Moreover, because
obligors may be unable to locate funds at a rate lower than that
on their original loan, prepayments tend to decrease. 2
In the short run, when thrift institutions find fewer dollars
available for mortgage lending, more expensive money and a
large number of mortgage loans outstanding at unfavorable
rates, induce increased interest rates on new mortgage loans.
Given the unpredictability of the economy, and the severe infla-
tion since the mid-1960s, however, these institutions face two
devastating problems. First, they recognize that they can no
longer predict the long term interest rate which will provide a
buffer against double digit inflation. Secondly, they recognize
that increased rates on new business alone will not ensure their
solvency."3 As a consequence, thrift institutions have been forc-
" See Appendix, Chart 1. A comparison between the yield rate on mort-
gages (column 2) and the accompanying rate of inflation in the economy (column 4)
reveals the unfavorable impact of progressive inflation on thrift institutions.
" See Appendix, Charts 1 & 2. Investors first seek high yield, low risk
returns, such as treasury bonds afford. See Financing Real Estate During the In-
flationary 80s, ABA Real Property Section 23. Although the author also suggests
a resulting increase in the corporate bond market, it is more likely that investors
would seek extremely short-term investments, since the value of the fixed
amount of corporate debt in dollars inflated over years would be far short of a
real return, which is return discounted for inflation.
42 See Downs, "Real Interest Rates Short-Change Lenders," NATIONAL REAL
ESTATE INVESTOR 26 (Oct. 1980). This Brookings Institute study revealed alarming
danger signals for thrift lenders. Assuming self-amortizing loans over twenty-five
years and prepayment at the end of ten years, it found the average contract rate
and real return figures over the last thirty years were as follows:
Loans Made Average Contract Average Real
Rate Interest Rate
1951-1959 5.02 3.51
1960-1969 6.58 2.15
1970-1975 9.34 1.73
See generally, Comment, Use of Due-on Clauses to Gain Collateral
Benefits: A Common Sense Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590, 592 (1975):
The basic dilemma of the savings association business is an inability to
adjust earnings upward during periods of inflation accompanied by ris-
ing interest rates .... quoting United States League of Savings & Loan
Assocations, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON SAVINGS ASSOCIA-
TIONS NEEDS (1970).
[Vol. 84
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ed to come up with long term measures designed to remedy
these problems." One important measure to ensure solvency con-
sists in innovative drafting of the terms in writings which em-
body mortgage rights and obligations.
One such drafting device is the due-on-sale clause." By its
plain meaning, this clause allows the mortgagee to require the
mortgagor to repay the loan immediately and in full if he fails to
make timely payments or if he transfers his interest in the prop-
erty without the mortgagee's consent. During periods of falling
interest rates, conflict over this clause is unlikely. The mort-
gagor may seek additional funds in an attempt to prepay his
debt to the mortgagee. If he tenders prepayment, the mortga-
gee must absorb the lost interest payments as a risk of doing
business. 5 Moreover, if the mortgagor is contemplating sale of
his property, his purchaser will seek refinancing at the current
market rate."6
In periods of escalating inflation, however, this clause gives
rise to a severe conflict between the mortgagor and mortgagee.
Cognizant that the market rate exceeds the mortgagor's loan
rate, the mortgagor and his prospective purchaser frequently
seek the mortgagee's approval of a loan assumption at the ori-
, Clearly, if a borrower were able to pass on to a vendee the
borrower's low interest rate without interference by the lender, all
mortgages would continue at the rate until their original maturity date.
The effect of this increased payoff time over the current average actual
payoff time of eight to ten years would be to freeze a lender's income at
unprofitable levels for twenty to thirty years. Id.
" These clauses were used extensively during the Great Depression, but
have made their strongest appearance since the early 1960's. Kratovil, A New
Dilemma For Thrift Institutions: Judicial Emasculation of the Due-on Sale
Clause, 12 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PROc. 299 (1979). They now are common
boilerplate in residential mortgage arrangements. See G. OSBORNE, G. HELSON, &
D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 295 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
OSBORNE]. For an example of a standard due-on-sale clause, see note 2 supra.
" The mortgagee's loss is equal to the total yield he would have received
had the original loan gone to maturity minus the sum of the interest received on
the original loan plus the yield on loans made with the prepayment funds invested
at the lower current market rate.
" Many commentators suggest that the mortgagor obtains the added
advantage of being able to obtain a higher selling price for his property when in-
terest rates fall. See, e.g., Dunn, Enforcement of Due-On Transfer Clauses, 13
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. 891, 926-30 (1978).
1982]
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ginal loan rate."" The mortgagee, seeking to cover costs, " often
withholds consent to the assumption until the prospective pur-
chaser agrees to pay the current market rate.49
If the parties cannot reach an agreement on new terms, the
mortgagor must await a willing purchaser, lower his price to
compensate for the higher current market rate of interest, or
transfer the property without consent. If he elects this third
option, the mortgagee will accelerate the debt, demanding that
its loan be returned. If the mortgagor cannot repay the loan im-
mediately, the mortgagee will institute foreclosure proceed-
ings.0
Since the mid-1960s, mortgagees increasingly have sought
foreclosure following a breakdown in negotiations over a loan as-
sumption."1 Since residential real estate market activity is de-
pendent directly upon mortgage financing, 2 widespread judicial
disapproval of the use of due-on-sale clauses to maintain a current
" In such a transaction the prospective purchaser agrees to assume primary
liability on the loan. The original mortgagor becomes secondarily liable. The loan
rate does not increase unless increase is a condition of the mortgagee's agreement
to the assumption. See OSBORNE, supra note 44, at 296.
" See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
41 Alternatively, the mortgagee may demand payment of a transfer or
assumption fee. This fee is expressed as a percentage of the loan outstanding.
Many states set a limit on the rate mortgagees can charge. See, e.g., Crockett v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585. If the current
market rate exceeds the rate on the original loan to the mortgagor by more than
the allowable fee percentage, the mortgagee will net a loss. In such cases, the
mortgagee's only alternative is. to renegotiate the loan at the current rate to
avoid a loss. Assume, for example, that a mortgagor obtained a loan in December
of 1971 for 7.6% and attempted to transfer the property in March of 1980, when
the contract rate was 12.25%. See Appendix, Chart 1. If this prospective pur-
chaser was able to force the mortgagee to agree to an assumption at 7.6%, then
the mortgagee could have expected to lose approximately 4.88% (the March 1980
yield rate minus the 1971 yield rate), for 17.95 years (26.2 years, the average
maturity of a 1971 loan minus 8.25 years, the period of time that the mortgagor
used the funds). Id. See also Occidental & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206
Neb. 469 at 479, 293 N.W.2d 843 at 849.
See, e.g., 206 Neb. at 470-71, 292 N.W.2d at 844.
s See, e.g., Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of
Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day 'Due-on-Sale' Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV.
485, 485-87 (1973).
52 Gibbons, The Money Market. A Key to Real Estate Valuation 37 THE
REAL ESTATE APPRAISER No. 5 at 24-29 (Sept.-Oct. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Gib-
bons].
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portfolio must place the mortgagee on one of the two horns of a
dilemma. Mortgagees either must increase the rate on all new
residential mortgagee loans to cover the losses attendant in
maintaining below market assumed loans,5 or they must operate
at a long term loss and a diminished capacity to provide new
mortgage dollars." The economic impact of either alternative is
a depression in the mortgage money market and a subsequent
decrease in housing production.5 5 As the following sections sug-
gest, improper judicial application of restraint on alienation
theory, or the equitable reasonableness test promotes these
results without adequate justification in traditional legal theory
or public policy goals. In contrast, application of contract theory
is wholly justifiable in legal theory and promotes the public
policy objectives of economic growth by aiding lender solvency
and providing the base for consumer access to mortgage dollars.
III. RESTRAINT THEORY: THE PER SE
RULE AND THE REASONABLENESS TEST
Establishing a satisfactory statement of restraint on aliena-
tion theory has been a source of continuing judicial controversy
since the passage of the statute Quia Emptores in 1290.56 On
its face this statute addresses certain limitations of the feudal
system. Lord Coke addressed a broader purpose in discussing
the legal basis for the statute. Essentially, he states, one who
has divested himself of a parcel of property such that he no
longer has an interest in it inhibits economic growth when he
seeks to control the new owner's ability to transfer an interest
in the property."7
See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
Id. For a discussion on this point, see infra and accompanying text. See
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:128-12 (West 1975), stating that the purpose behind sav-
ings and loan associations is the promotion of thrift, home ownership, housing and
investing to serve these purposes.
Gibbons, supra note 52, at 24-29.
18 Edw. 1, cc. 1-3 (1289-90). Enacted to quell powerful barons' discontent
with certain entrapments of the feudal system, the statute limited subinfeudation
by providing that tenants in fee, but not in capite, could alienate their land freely.
See L. SIMES & A. SMiTH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1114 (2d ed. 1956)
[hereinafter cited as SmIES & SMITH].
11[I t is absurd and repugnant to reason that he, that hath no possibility to
have the land revert to him, should restrain his feoffee in fee simple of
all his power to alien .... [The] condition ... is void, because his whole
1982]
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The English courts' response to the passage of the statute
was a dogged resolve to thwart those who would control the
transfer of a fee. 8 The evils the courts perceived were dead
hand control over property, massive accumulation of wealth by
one class, and the imposition of disguised feudal incidents . 9
American courts through the turn of this century continued to
hold rigidly to the view that restraints on alienation were void
because they offended the public policy objective of free market-
ability. 0 Even though imposition of disguised feudal incidents
was no longer a realistic reason for applying the rule, it remain-
ed true that the agrarian but rapidly modernizing society of that
time required greater judicial support of free marketability with
the corollary goal of as few limitations as possible.8
By mid-century, American society had developed a steadily
growing urban population and industrial sector. The pronounced
judicial trend was toward a more flexible approach to restraint
theory, rather than the per se rule of invalidity.2 The emerging
interest and propertie is out of him, so as he hath no possibilitie of a
reverter, and it is against trade and traffique, and bargaining and con-
tracting between man and man.3
E. Coke, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *233a.
0 See SIMES & SMITH § 1114. See also Reichman, The Anti-Lie" Another
Security Interest in Land, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 716-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Anti-Lien].
5 Anti-Lien, supra note 58, at 717.
See, e.g., Porter v. Tracey, 179 Iowa 1295, 162 N.W. 800 (1917); DePeyster
v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 57 Am. Dec. 470 (1852); Anderson v. Cary, 36 Ohio St. 506,
38 Am. Rep. 602 (1881; Richardson v. Danson, 44 Wash.2d 760, 270 P.2d 802
(1954).
"
1Judge Murnaghan in Williams v. First Fed Say. & Loan Ass'n remarks on
this point as follows:
Appellants' counsel traces the origins of the legal concept outlaw-
ing unreasonable restraints on alienation to the 1290 Statute Quia Emp-
tores, the Statute of Westminster, 18 Edw. I. ch. 1. That statute,
eliminating the feudal relationship of the feoffee to all mesne lords
beneath the king, and limiting to the king the right to impose restraints
on alienation, is only of historical interest. There has been little occasion
to invoke the statute in the United States, because of the allodial nature
of holdings in this country. 28 Am. Jur.2d pp. 74-75 (Estates § 4). Tenure
in Virginia is allodial. 1 Minor, Real Property, § 16 (2d ed. 1928).
In considering the due-on-sale clause it merits remembering that it
is "imposed" not by a predecessor in the homeowner's chain of title-a
mesne landlord, but by a collateral lender concerned with security for
its loan. Quia Emptores hardly seems to extend to such matters.
651 F.2d 910, 921 n.25.
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rule, already well entrenched in Kentucky, for example, was to
allow restraints which were reasonable under the circum-
stances. 3 Even states not directly supporting the reasonable-
ness test had alluded obiter dictum to its desirability.64
As the inflationary spiral gathered momentum in the 1960s
and 1970s, however, the reasonableness rule came to be an un-
satisfactory solution even though it gained judicial favor. During
this period the judicial struggle precipitated three patterns.
Under the first pattern, the mortgagee cannot show reason-
ableness without alleging and proving that his security has been
impaired. Under the second pattern, reasonableness is presum-
ed. Under the third pattern reasonableness is presumed, but the
reasonableness concept includes the current portfolio argument.
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Nichols v. Ann Arbor
Federal Savings & Loan Association,5 provided a prime exam-
ple of the first pattern. There, the mortgagor transferred his
property by land contract without having obtained the mortga-
gee's consent.6 Finding the standard due-on-sale clause an in-
direct restraint, the court held that the mortgagee cannot estab-
lish reasonableness without alleging and proving "a threat to
... [a] legitimate interest sufficient to justify the restraint on
alienation inherent in its enforcement."6 7 Such threats include
See Sweet, Restraints on Alienation, 33 LAW Q. REV. 236, 246 (1917).
See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26-32 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See also
Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57
MICH. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1959).
" In Maryland, for example, the courts arguably approved the reason-
ableness test by limiting the judicial definition of a restraint on alienation. See,
e.g., Hardgrove v. Hardgrove, 240 Md. 634, 215 A.2d 183 (1965) (temporal restric-
tion on power of sale in a devise not a restraint on alienation); Harman v. Hurst,
160 Md. 96, 153 A.24 (1931) (grantor reservation of power of sale not a restraint);
Weinbeck v. Dahms, 134 Md. 464, 107 A. 12 (1919) (court should construe deed as
conveying limited estate, where the language permits, rather than as containing
restraint on alienation).
73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977).
Id. at 164, 250 N.W.2d at 805.
', Id. A direct restraint is a provision "which, by its express terms, or by im-
plication of facts purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise' of the power of
alienation." SIMES & SMITH § 1112 (2d ed. 1956). The three categories of direct
restraints include disabling, promissory and forfeiture restraints. SIMES & SMITH
§ 1131. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT]. A disabling restraint arises when the grantor withholds from the
grantee the power to convey. SIMES & SMITH § 1148; RESTATEMENT at § 401(1)(a).
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waste, depreciation and the "moral risk" of having to resort to
the security." According to this court, however, acceleration
solely to maintain a current portfolio is not enforceable as an
exercise of a reasonable restraint.69
The Mississippi Supreme Court reached the same result
with less explanation in Sanders v. Hicks.7 Although in Sanders
the property involved was a gasoline station, the court gave no
indication that it would treat residential mortgages differently.
Reasoning that the right to transfer property is an incident of
ownership, 71 the court held that the standard due-on-sale clause
is an invalid restraint unless the mortgagee can demonstrate im-
pairment of his security interest."2
The second pattern, unlike the first, includes cases in which
the court considers acceleration reasonable without the mortga-
gee's allegation or proof of impairment. The mortgagor or new
purchaser may rebut this presumption by establishing the exist-
ence of such defenses as inequitable or unconscionable conduct
by the mortgagee.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Baker v. Loves Park Savings
& Loan Association" provided the best illustration of this se-
cond pattern. In Baker, the mortgagee conditioned its consent to
the mortgagor's transfer on a one percent increase in the loan
rate.7" Reviewing only the question of whether the standard due-
on-sale clause is a reasonable restraint, the court held that the
utility of the restraint must be weighed against its harmful ef-
A promissory restraint arises when the grantor conditions the grant on the
grantee's promise. SIMES & SMITH at § 1131; RESTATEMENT at § 401(1)(b). A
forfeiture restraint arises when under the terms of the grant the grantee must
forfeit the interest conveyed if he attempts to transfer the property. SIMES &
SMITH § 1131; RESTATEMENT § 404(1)(c).
An indirect restraint arises where a restraint exists for a "purpose other
than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental result that the instru-
ment, if valid, would restrain practical alienability." SIMES & SMITH § 1112.
73 Mich. App. at 169, 250 N.W.2d at 807, (quoting Tucker v. Lasson Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d at 638-39, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175).
69 Id. at 174, 250 N.W.2d at 809.
70 317 So. 2d 61 (Mis. 1975).
,' Id. at 63.
Id. at 63-64.
, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
,' Id. at 121, 333 N.E.2d at 3.
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fects.8 Where economic and social considerations "dictate that a
partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their fulfillment,
such a restraint should be sustained."78 Since the mortgagee's
extension of credit depends on the existence of both the prop-
erty as security and the personal integrity of the borrower, the
clause serves the socially and economically important purpose of
protecting the mortgagee's security interest.77 Moreover, the
court reasoned, such a restraint must carry a presumption of
validity instead of depending solely upon the facts of each case
for enforcement. 8 The court explained that such a policy pro-
motes necessary certainty in this area of the law, using as an ex-
ample its belief that an attorney should be able to determine the
effect of such a restraint when he searches a title.71
The Colorado Supreme Court has presented a third ap-
proach to the issue whether a mortgage provision for accelera-
tion and subsequent rate escalation unlawfully restrain aliena-
tion. In Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings & Loan Association,"
the court held that the clause was a reasonable restraint when
balanced against the mortgagee's "justifiable interests" in the
property."' It held, moreover, that the mortgagee has such a
"justifiable interest" in protecting itself against interest rate in-
creases that its rate escalation to maintain a current portfolio is
equally valid." The court explained that the loan supply and de-
mand imbalance, created in an inflationary economy, had "re-
quired ... [lenders] to adopt measures which would protect the
borrowers as well as the lenders from the hazards of long-term
loans (20-30 years) at fixed interest rates."" The court reasoned
75 Id. at 124-26, 333 N.E.2d at 4.
78 Id. at 124, 333 N.E.2d at 3-4, (quoting Gale v. York Center Comm. Coop.,
Inc., 21 Ill. 2d 86, 92-93, 171 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1960)).
" Id. at 122-23, 333 N.E.2d at 4.
78 Id. at 125-26, 333 N.E.2d at 5.
1 Id. See also Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 545 P.2d 546
(Wash. 1976). The Washington Supreme Court stated that the mortgagee's exer-
cise of the clause to increase the loan rate upon transfer was a reasonable
restraint, even where the mortgagee does not allege impairment of his security.
Id. at 549. The thrust of the court's analysis, however, is a discussion of contract
principles. For discussion on this point, see generally text accompanying notes
187-230 infra.
1 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
81 Id. at 300, 509 P.2d at 1243.
2 Id. at 301, 509 P.2d at 1244.
Id. at 302, 509 P.2d at 1244.
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that lenders have adopted the standard due-on-sale clause and
the variable interest rate to balance the cost of lending money
with the cost of holding deposit accounts with even minimal
assurance of solvency in severely inflationary times.u Finding
the variable rate less advantageous to the consumer, the court
determined that the due-on-sale clause and escalation provided
the best solution. 5 If the market rate declines, the consumer can
prepay. If it rises, the mortgage rate remains the same. When
the mortgagor transfers the property, the new loan is usually
lower than market, but certainly no higher.8 In this court's
view, the only remaining alternative-short-term loans of less
than ten years and significantly higher rates-fails to provide a
balanced solution.
8 7
The one leading case which does not fall into an established
pattern is Wellenkamp v. Bank of America.8 Decided in 1978,
'Id.
Id. at 303, 509 P.2d at 1245.
8, Id.
Id. In 1977 the Colorado legislature dampened the effect of this decision:
38-30-165. Unreasonable restraint on the alienation of prop-
erty-prohibited practices. [1] Subject to the limitations and exceptions
as provided in this section, any person with a security interest in real
estate shall not, directly or indirectly:
[b] Increase the interest rate more than one percent per anum [sic]
above the existing interest rate of the indebtedness or otherwise
modify, for the benefit of the holder of the security interest, the terms
and conditions of the indebtedness secured by such real estate, on ac-
count of the sale or transfer of such real estate or on account of the
assumption of such indebtedness; or
[d] Enforce or attempt to enforce the provisions of any mortgage,
deed of trust, or other real estate security instrument executed on or
after July 1, 1975, which provisions are contrary to this section; but this
section shall not be applicable to instruments executed prior to July 1,
1975, not to the rights, duties, or interests flowing therefrom....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-165 (1980 Supp.) In VonEhrenkrook v. Midland Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 196 Colo. 179, 585 P.2d 589 (1978), the supreme court refused to
apply the statute to mortgage agreements negotiated prior to the statute's enact-
ment.
' 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). In 1973 the Mans ex-
ecuted to the Bank of America a deed of trust and promissory note at 8% to
secure a mortgage on residential property. Id. at 946, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 381. The deed of trust contained a standard due-on-sale clause. Id. Two
years later, the Mans sold the property to Mrs. Wallenkamp, agreeing to a loan
assumption but neglecting to obtain Bank of America's consent. Id. When the
bank conditioned its consent on a rate escalation to 9-3/4/0, Mrs. Wallenkamp
[Vol. 84
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss2/4
THE "D UE-ON-SALE'" CLA USE
this case illustrates the pernicious effect of restraint theory on
lenders, brought on by judicial misunderstanding of inflationary
economics.
Breaking with the California Supreme Court progression
which initiated the modern trend,89 the Wallenkamp court held
that the mortgagee's exercise of a standard due-on-sale clause
and subsequent rate escalation after the mortgagor's sale of the
property constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation
unless the security actually was impaired. In the usual case,
the court explained, the new purchaser's down payment is his in-
centive against waste or depreciation.91 Secondly, the court held
that a mortgagee's use of the clause to maintain a current port-
folio is an unreasonable restraint for two reasons 2 ' First, the
clause was developed to protect the mortgagee's security inter-
est, which purpose is not served by the rate escalation.9" Second,
since in this court's view the economic risks inherent in inflation
exist in every transaction, lending institutions should determine
their interest rates accordingly, and not attempt to burden
mortgagors with the consequences of mistaken economic projec-
tions.94 With no discussion of the economic and public policy ef-
refused the offer and subsequently sought to enjoin the bank from foreclosing. Id.
Mrs. Wallenkamp claimed that the bank must allege and prove impairment of its
security, while the bank argued that it was entitled to automatic exercise of the
due-on-sale clause. Id. The superior court dismissed the action with prejudice for
failure to state a claim. Id.
" See Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489
P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392
P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964). In Coast Bank, the court established the
reasonableness approach to restraint theory and held that reasonableness turned
on whether the restraint was reasonably necessary to prevent impairment of the
mortgagee's security. 61 Cal 2d at 316-17, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508. In
LaSala, the court approved the exercise of a due-on-encumbrance clause, stating
that the reasonableness test requires a weighing of the degree of restraint and its
effects against justifications for use of the clause. 5 Cal. 3d at 877-80, 489 P.2d
1121-24, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 857-59. In Tucker, the court applied LaSala and held that
exercise of the standard due-on-sale clause upon transfer via land contract was an
unreasonable restraint when weighted against its justification. 12 Cal. 3d at 637-40,
526 P.2d at 1172-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39. The lender in such cases, therefore,
must allege and prove impairment to recover. Id.
0 21 Cal. 3d at 953-54, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
Id. at 951-52, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
Id. at 952-53, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
93 Id.
" Id.
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fects of this ingenuous solution to mortgage financing, the Wal-
lenkamp court struck down mortgagee escalation under the
standard due-on-sale clause.
Wallenkamp, like the cases within the three current pat-
terns, rests on shaky analytical ground. Based on the erroneous
assumption that the due-on-sale provision constitutes the type of
restraint to which at least the spirit of the statute Quia Emp-
tores was directed, the most that can be said of these cases is
that they promote a common law concept which has outlived its
usefulness. Moreover, they support a theory too inflexible to
allow the current portfolio argument, without which the public
policy objectives of encouraging economic growth, consumer ac-
cess to the lowest priced mortgage dollars, and marketability of
property, will suffer.
In explaining the purpose behind the statute Quia Emp-
tores,95 Lord Coke remarked on the absurdity of allowing a
grantor, who had conveyed all of his interest in a piece of prop-
erty, to control how his grantee disposed of the property."0
Allowing such control, he reasoned, is contrary to settle prin-
ciples of trade and contract. 97
The current residential mortgage transaction, whether in a
state which follows the lien theory or title theory of mortgages,
falls outside the difficulty Lord Coke envisioned. In lien theory
states"8 the mortgagee holds only a security interest in the prop-
erty." Because he does not hold title, the statute as Lord Coke
understood it cannot apply. In title theory states, ' technically
the mortgagee holds legal title until default, at which time he
obtains the right to possession. 101 In practical terms, however,
title theory courts have chosen to denominate the mortgagor as
" See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
0 See notes 56, 57 & 61 supra and accompanying text.
9 Id.
98 These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. OSBORNE, supra note 44, § 4.2.
'Id.
10 These states are primarily those east of the Mississippi River, excepting
South Carolina, New York and Missouri. OSBORNE, supra note 44, § 1.5.
01 OSBORNE, supra note 44, § 4.1.
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the property owner and to treat the mortgagee as the lien
holder."0 2 In many title states, the mortgagee's interest is now
limited specifically to a chose-in-action or a chattel interest.1 3 In
practice, then, the statutory purpose behind Quia Emptores, as
Lord Coke explains it, is equally inapplicable to mortgage trans-
actions in title theory states.
Most likely, the reason that a comparison of the purpose of a
very old statute with the modern residential mortgage transac-
tion causes confusion is that the latter is primarily contractual,
whereas the former is caught up in the vagaries of common law
property conveyancing.' 4 Although the mortgage appears simi-
lar in form to a deed because it involves a conveyance, 5 it is
actually a commercial instrument, because it has no function
without a debt to secure. ' The debt is the heart of the transac-
tion, while the technical transfer of property rights is merely
security for payment. In the commercially unsophisticated four-
teenth century, all of the ceremonies of a transfer of ownership
accompanied the creation of the mortgage.17 In modern times,
however, as courts in both lien and title states appear to agree,
the property interest transfer is in name only and the mort-
gagee is essentially no more than a secured creditor. 8
Courts that insist on tying mortgage debt transactions to
property law through restraint theory encounter yet another
hurdle. They must categorize the due-on-sale provision as either
a direct or an indirect restraint on alienation. As the North
Carolina and Nebraska courts have pointed out,"0 9 neither char-
acterization is correct. 10 The due-on-sale clause is not a direct
restraint, because by its express terms it neither limits nor pro-
hibits alienation of the property."' Moreover, the clause is not
102 See .R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 117 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as KRATOVIL]. The alternative was for the courts to call the
mortgagor a tenant at sufferance or at will, either being a strained construction.
Id. at 117.
103 rd.
r' Id. at 23.
105 Id. at 47.
Id. at 71.
ro, Id. at 23.
IC See notes 98-103 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 1-19 supra and accompanying text.
110 See notes 1-19 and 67 supra and accompanying text.
"' See notes 2 and 67 supra and accompanying text.
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an indirect restraint, because it does not limit the freedom to
alienate in any meaningful sense."' Instead, the standard due-on-
sale clause is a provision requiring the initial borrower to give
the lender notice that he intends to place the security beyond
the facile reach of the lender as expressed in the original agree-
ment. The purpose of this notice is to allow the lender to deter-
mine whether he would prefer to keep the same or make differ-
ent arrangements with the prospective purchaser. In periods of
severe inflation, then, the indirect restraint on transfer results
from market escalation instead of from the exercise of the stand-
ard due-on-sale clause.
From a public policy standpoint, restraint theory is highly of-
fensive. Application of traditional property rules regarding
mortgagee acceleration and upgrading of loan portfolios re-
quires that mortgagees absorb losses which, over the long run,
will precipitate insolvency or require federal government finan-
cial support. While the impact on economic growth is disconcert-
ing, the impact on consumers is even worse. In an effort to pro-
tect consumers against the moneylenders, the courts have added
upward pressure to new loan rates and placed mortgage financ-
ing beyond many consumers' reach. By failing to reevaluate the
purposes of restraint theory, the courts have created a legally
unjustifiable economic hardship.
IV. EQUITY AND CONTRACT THEORY: THE
STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE REASONABLENESS TEST AND THE
CURRENT PORTFOLIO ARGUMENT
Since traditional foreclosure has been a proceeding in
equity, many courts have framed their decisions in large part
with a discussion of equitable principles. These courts agree
that a due-on-sale clause, bargained for by the parties, provides
a reasonable means by which the mortgagee can protect his final
interests.'
The split of authority arises in how the courts define protec-
tion. One faction limits the mortgagee to protection of his secur-
ity interest.' In essence, this view is a restatement in equity
112 Id.
II See generally notes 117-230 infra and accompanying text.
See generally notes 187-230 infra and accompanying text.
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language of the reasonableness test."' The second faction ap-
plies contract theory to the problem. These courts recognize
that the mortgagee cannot remain solvent in an inflationary
market unless he can adjust revenues to match costs in the long
run. ' Following this current portfolio argument, these courts
support the mortgagee's decision to accelerate even though his
sole purpose is to obtain the current market rate on the new
loan.
A. The Reasonableness Test Restated in Equity
Courts in Arkansas, Arizona, Florida and Oklahoma have
been the strongest proponents of the first view. ' Applying
equity theory, these courts deny the mortgagee foreclosure
unless it can be demonstrated that the mortgagor's transfer has
jeopardized the value of his security. "8 This analysis falls short
of the mark in several respects. It assumes an overly expansive
reading of equitable principles as they are set out by the author-
ities. ' It further erroneously assumes that the due-on-sale pro-
vision incorporated into the mortgage is the type of acceleration
clause to which Uniform Commercial Code section 1-208 is ad-
dressed. ' Moreover, it ignores the severely disproportionate
financial impact the mortgagee suffers when he cannot pass on
to new loan consumers his increased costs of doing business. 21
The Arkansas Supreme Court set forth the fullest statement
of this view in Tucker v. Pulaski Federal Savings & Loan
Association.112 There, Tucker executed a note secured by a
Il Id.
118 See generally notes 187-230 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Harn, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190
(1971); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725
(1972); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla.
1977).
See, e.g., Tucker, 252 Ark. at 851-54, 481 S.W.2d at 728-31.
" For discussion of authority on equity theory, see notes 136-147 infra and
accompanying text.
" For discussion on this point see notes 177-186 infra and accompanying
text. Cf. discussion of U.C.C. § 9-506 notes 187-191 infra and accompanying text.
"' For a discussion of the effect on mortgages, see notes 45-52 supra and ac-
companying text.
12 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
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mortgage on a small apartment building he intended to use for
residential and rental purposes.1? The mortgage contained a
standard due-on-sale clause 12' After unsuccessfully seeking Pula-
ski's approval of a prospective purchaser, Tucker sold the prop-
erty.12 Pulaski accelerated the debt and sought foreclosure,
alleging a violation of the agreement.1 21 In his answer, Tucker
asserted that Pulaski's action constituted an oppressive and
arbitrary exercise of its rights under the agreement.'2 The trial
court granted foreclosure, finding that Pulaski validly had exer-
cised its right to accelerate the debt.128 It further found that,
even though Pulaski had "valid business reasons"'u for its
refusal to consent to the transfer, it owed no duty to justify its
decision."'
Reversing the trial court, the Arkansas Supreme Court
stated that a mortgagor should be granted relief from foreclo-
sure where the mortgagee's conduct is inequitable."'1 Restating
the reasonableness test in equity terms, the court held that ac-
celerating the debt without proof that the security had been jeo-
pardized constitutes a penalty as well as an unreasonable exer-
cise of rights under the agreement. 32 To obtain foreclosure, the
mortgagee must show valid business reasons for withholding
consent to the transfer."' As examples of transfers to which a
mortgagee would have valid business reasons to object, the
court postulated a sale to a buyer having a history of conducting
illegal operations on his property, wasting his property, ignor-
ing his debts, or intermittently being unemployed.' Absent this
or similar evidence that the security has been impaired, the
Arkansas court apparently is inclined to balance the equities in
favor of the mortgagor. If the mortgagee can withhold his con-
sent without justification, the court reasoned, the mortgagor
" Id. at 849-50, 481 S.W.2d at 726.
124 Id.
125 Id.
125 Id.
1217 Id.
1" Id. at 851, 481 S.W.2d at 727.
125 Id.
130 Id.
Id. at 852, 481 S.W.2d at 728.
13 Id. at 853, 481 S.W.2d at 729.
Id. at 853-55, 481 S.W.2d at 729-31.
Id. at 853, 481 S.W.2d at 729.
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who must sell his property quickly will be forced to suffer a
financial loss.1
In finding that Pulaski's exercise of the mortgage accelera-
tion clause constituted an unenforceable penalty, the Arkansas
court promoted an unjustifiable expansive reading of equity
theory. By cursory analysis, the court ignored two issues, the re-
solution of which, it is suggested, requires a balancing of
equities in favor of the lender.
The first issue concerns what relief an equity court will give
a mortgagee who seeks enforcement of an acceleration provi-
sion. Authorities agree that equity will not enforce a penalty or
forfeiture where the provision's sole purpose is to ensure per-
formance under the agreement and where the harm can be mea-
sured in damages.13 If the sole purpose of the provision is to
secure the debt, however, the harm is not measureable in
damages and equity may refuse the debtor relief until he pays
both principal and interest due.137 Applied to the mortgagee's re-
quest for acceleration, this clause makes clear that, even were
acceleration a penalty, his remedy is the payment he seeks from
the mortgagor.
The second issue is whether a standard due-on-sale clause in
mortgage constitutes a penalty. Pomeroy, a leading authority
on equity, states that acceleration upon default of an installment
note which expressly conditions acceleration upon default of in-
stallment payments "has nothing in common with a penalty and
is as valid and operative in equity as at the law." '
Of the two acceleration provisions Pomeroy denounced as a
penalty, neither resembles the acceleration clause the mortga-
gee exercises under a standard agreement. 3 ' The first is the
mortgagee's acceleration of the debt upon default of punctual
payment of taxes or assessments where default is "due to mere
I d.
11 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 433 (5th ed. Symons ed. 1941)
[hereinafter cited as POMEROY].
I" Id. See also § 450 stating that forfeiture will be set aside upon payment of
money owed.
"' POMEROY § 439.
112 For content of the standard due-on-sale clause, see note 2 supra and ac-
companying text.
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venial inattention" and the mortgagee is not harmed."' In
Pomeroy's view, such an oversight, absent harm to the mortga-
gee, does not warrant acceleration, even though the parties
have so agreed.1 By contrast, the standard due-on-sale clause
provides for acceleration upon far more than an oversight, and
the resulting harm to the mortgagee is severe."2
Pomeroy's second example of a penalty is a case in which a
non-installment contract provision conditions acceleration upon
"any breach," but damages are easily ascertainable or the out-
standing balance due would be disproportionate as a damages
award.' When damages are not easily ascertainable or the out-
standing balance due is not disproportionate to the harm, then
the provision is one for liquidated damages."4 By this principle,
the due-on-sale clause constitutes a liquidated damages provi-
sion and not a penalty. The mortgagee's damages equal the
amount of interest he must forgo in a rising interest market if
he is denied exercise of the clause and forced to allow assump-
tion at the lower rate. Consequently, an equity court should
allow him to exercise his acceleration rights under the clause to
maintain a current portfolio and thereby allow him liquidated
damages.
The other problem Pulaski raises is whether the court
should have balanced the equities and thereby considered a sig-
nificant increase in the mortgagee's costs a valid business
reason for exercising an acceleration clause. By defining reason-
ableness solely by reference to impairment of security, the Ar-
kansas court overlooked the financial burden it placed on
Pulaski and other Arkansas lenders. The lending rate increased
approximately two percent during the five years that Tucker
held his loan,'y increasing Pulaski's costs. Tucker's costs, on the
other hand, did not increase relatively. On the contrary, several
authorities argue that a seller in Tucker's position usually will
"' POMEROY § 439. See also § 451 and § 455a. Equity will relieve a mortgagor
from forfeiture if his circumstance is the result of unavoidable accident, fraud,
surprise or ignorance, or "unusual circumstances beyond his control."
"' Id.
14 For a discussion of the effect on the lender, see text accompanying notes
45-52, supra.
'U POMEROY § 444a. See also § 445 and § 459. Equity will deny a forfeiture
claim where forfeiture is disproportionate to the harm.
144 Id.
"' See Appendix, Chart I, infra.
[Vol. 84
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss2/4
THE "D UE-ON-SALE" CLA USE
obtain a higher selling price because of the favorable loan rate
he can offer a purchaser. '46 In an inflationary market, then, the
Arkansas court's balancing of equities likely guarantees the
mortgagor a windfall, while it signifies to the mortgagee that his
current rates must include future cost increases if he is to re-
main solvent.'4 7
On similar facts, the Arizona Court of Appeals in Baltimore
Life Insurance Co. v. Ham"8 dismissed the claim of the mortga-
gee's assignee for failure to allege impairment of security.
There, the Harns executed a note and mortgage containing a
standard due-on-sale clause to Western American Mortgage
Company. " 9 Western American then negotiated the note and
assigned the mortgage to Baltimore Life.'50 When the Harns sub-
sequently transferred the property without consent, Baltimore
Life accelerated the debt and eventually instituted foreclosure
proceedings.'
The court of appeals acknowledged that the parties to a note
and mortgage "may enter into such agreements as they deem
necessary to the transaction of their business."'' it held, how-
ever, that unless the mortgagee alleges that his security has
been impaired and, therefore, that the purpose of the clause has
been jeopardized, foreclosure on these facts would constitute
"an extreme penalty."' 5 Essentially, then, the Arizona court
adopted the same reasonableness test as the Arkansas court.'M
The difference is that the Arizona court characterized the accel-
eration as a penalty without explanation and specifically stated
that the purpose of the clause is to prevent impairment of secur-
ity.
Citing Baltimore Life, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in
Continental Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Fetter ex-
pressly adopted the Arizona approach on slightly different
II6 See text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
147 Id.
15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971).
142 Id. at 79, 486 P.2d at 191.
ISO Id. at 80, 486 P.2d at 192.
151 Id.
152 Id.
15 Id. at 81, 486 P.2d at 193.
I" The Arizona court decided Baltimore Life one year before the Arkansas
court decided Tucker.
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facts.'55 There, the Fetters executed a note and mortgage con-
taining a standard due-on-sale clause to Continental.2 8 When
they sought Continental's consent to a loan assumption, how-
ever, they learned that consent would be forthcoming upon pay-
ment of a one percent transfer fee. 57 The Fetters ignored the
conditional consent and transferred the property. 5 ' Continental
accelerated the debt and, upon non-payment, brought suit to
foreclose."9 Following discovery, the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the Fetters, finding the transfer fee unrea-
sonable." 0
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, stating that equity
will not impose "an extreme penalty on the mortgagor with no
showing that he has violated the substance of the agreement"
by impairing the security."'1 The court offered no explanation of
how the transfer fee constituted a penalty. Furthermore, the
court was mistaken in its finding that the fee was three times
the actual transfer cost.62 Apparently considering only the ad-
ministrative costs, the court ignored the six and two-tenths per-
cent inflation rate and the increased contract rate during the
year for which the Fetters held the property."' In so doing, the
court overlooked the fact that Continental had demanded less
than the rate which would reflect its full costs upon transfer.
Following the view set forth by the Arkansas, Arizona and
Oklahoma courts, the Florida appellate court in First Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Lockwood'" affirmed the trial
court's entry of summary judgment against First Federal. In
that case, the Lockwoods in 1973 executed a note which contain-
ed a standard due-on-sale clause and which was incorporated by
11 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
11 Id. at 1015.
1 Id. The Fetters purchased the property in 1972 and approached Continen-
tal about assumption in 1973. Although Continental policy dictated the one per-
cent transfer fee, the inflation rate for 1973 was 6.2 percent and the contract rate
had increased from 7.45 to 8.22. See FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN Chart A31 (April
1974). See also BUSINESS CONDITIONS DIGEST, HISTORICAL DATA FOR SELECTED
SERIES 99 (May 1980).
II 564 P.2d at 1015.
112 Id. at 1016.
1I0 Id.
Id. at 1018.
182 Id. at 1019.
'6 See Appendix, Chart 1. See also text accompanying note 157 supra.
,6' 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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reference in the mortgage. 5 In March 1978 the Lockwoods
transferred the property without First Federal's consent but
with actual knowledge that First Federal had conditioned its
consent on escalation of the loan rate to the current market
level. '68 First Federal accelerated the debt and instituted fore-
closure proceedings, alleging a violation of the agreement. 6 '
The appellate court noted the split of authority on the issue
whether the mortgagee's interests must be threatened before
an equity court will grant him foreclosure. '68 Nevertheless, it
held that the purpose of the clause was to protect the mortga-
gee's security."9 Relying on the Florida precedent of Clark v.
Lachenmeier,10 the court conditioned recovery in a court of
equity on a showing of impairment.'' In so doing, the First Fed-
eral court ignored the full import of Clark. In Clark the court
had stated that equity must deny foreclosure where the mortga-
gor has transferred the property without consent and "where no
harm has resulted to [the] mortgagee from such a conveyance. '7
Apparently construing this language in favor of the mortgagor,
the First Federal court read "no harm" to mean "no impairment
of security." Had the court balanced the equities at all, it would
have recognized that First Federal indeed had been harmed by a
transfer which denied it recovery of its increased costs between
1973 and 1978.1'7
The final difficulty each of these cases raises is the court's
failure to distinguish between acceleration clauses conditioned
on the creditor's insecurity and those conditioned on default. In-
security clauses expressly condition acceleration on the
creditor's whim or on his assessment of the point at which he
deemed himself insecure.74 Default clauses expressly condi-
'" Id. at 157.
I6Id.
"6 Id.
' Id. at 159.
, Id.
So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). In Clark, the court stated without
supporting rationale that foreclosure on essentially the same facts would be in
equitable absent a showing, that the security was impaired by the transfer. 237
So. 2d at 585.
"I 385 So. 2d at 159.
17 237 So. 2d at 585.
1 See Appendix, Charts 1 & 2.
I See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 1087-90 (2d ed. 1980).
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tion acceleration on specified acts which only the mortgagor can
commit." By requiring the mortgagee to demonstrate impair-
ment of his security, the courts which restate the reasonable-
ness test in equity have overlooked the default language con-
tained in the due-on-sale clause."" Moreover, they have severely
altered the equities in favor of the mortgagor.
As Justice Fogleman suggested in his dissent in Tucker v.
Pulaski,77 if these courts insist on applying insecurity clause
theory in mortgage default cases, they should align mortgage
theory with the standards set out in Uniform Commercial Code
section 1-208.1"8 This standard provides a balancing of the equi-
ties by lessening the inordinate burden the reasonableness test
places on the mortgagee in a severely inflationary market.
Under section 1-208, the mortgagee must demonstrate his good
faith belief that his security has been impaired and the mort-
gagor must prove lack of good faith.7 9 Were this standard
applied, the mortgagee could make a colorable argument that he
in good faith believes his security to be impaired if he can show
that the value of the security is less than the amount of the loan
plus his costs, including the amount he must forgo if he is forced
to accept assumption at a rate far below the current market
rate. Under the reasonableness test, however, the mortgagee
carries the entire burden since he must demonstrate actual im-
pairment. The mortgagee who conditions consent to transfer
solely on assumption at the current market rate in order to re-
main solvent cannot meet this test. Instead, in a severely infla-
tionary market he can obtain his objective more easily by con-
senting to transfer to a marginally stable buyer, foreclosing
upon default in payment and renegotiating a new loan at the
175 Id. For the contents of a standard due-on-sale clause, see text accompany-
ing note 2 supra.
178 Id.
17 252 Ark. at 856-61, 481 S.W.2d at 732-37 (Foggleman, J., dissenting).
178 "A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may acceler-
ate payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral 'at will'
or 'when he deems himself insecure' or in words of similar import shall be con-
strued to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of
establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been
exercised." U.C.C. § 1-208 (1972 version).
179 Id. See also 252 Ark. at 856-61, 481 S.W.2d at 732-37 (Foggleman, J.,
dissenting).
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higher current rate. Although no court has condoned such marg-
inal practices, application of the reasonableness test is such a
fashion clearly pressures the mortgagee to await anxiously the
transferee's default.
Despite the equitable balance section 1-208 provides, the
proper procedure in due-on-sale clause costs arises from Code
section 9-506.11 This section governs cases in which the parties'
express agreement conditions acceleration upon a specified act
constituting default and provides that upon default the entire
amount is due in one installment.'81 When acceleration occurs,
the debtor may forgo his interest in the collateral or may redeem
it from his creditor by payment in full.'82 The mortgagee need not
demonstrate his belief that his security has been impaired. This
requirement, while necessary in security clause cases where the
mortgagor ultimately controls the conditions of acceleration, is
unnecessary in default cases. The mortgagor who enters into
such an agreement has notice of which acts constitute default.
Under the standard due-on-sale clause he is on notice that these
acts include transfer without the mortgagee's consent.' 3 To ob-
tain relief he must bear the burden of showing that acceleration
pursuant to the agreement is inequitable. As Pomeroy suggests,
equity will not rescue the mortgagor from the consequences of
his agreement by deeming the acceleration a penalty.'8' In at-
tempting to show inequity in a typical case, the mortgagor's
defense boils down to an argument that acceleration pursuant
to the agreement lowers his selling price on the property' 5
and increases the cost to his transferee, a stranger to the
bargain. Further, if the court balances the equities, it must
'" "At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or
entered into a contract for its disposition under section 9-504 or before the obliga-
tion has been discharged under section 9-505(2) the debtor or any other secured
party may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral
by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the
expenses reasonably incurred by the secured party in retaking, holding and
preparing the collateral for disposition, in arranging for the sale, and to the ex-
tent provided in the agreement and not prohibited by law, his reasonable attor-
neys' fees and legal expenses." U.C.C. § 9-506 (1972 version).
"' Id. See also Official Comment.
182 Id.
"' See text accompanying note 2 supra.
' For discussion on this point, see text accompanying notes 136-147 supra.
" See, e.g., Tucker, 252 Ark. at 853, 481 S.W.2d at 729.
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consider the severe effect forced assumption at the lower rate
will have on the mortgagee. While the effect may be slight in a
quiet market, it may threaten the mortgagee's solvency in
periods of high inflation.18
B. Contract Theory: The Current Portfolio Argument
Many courts have adopted an approach similar to that of
section 9-506, thereby placing on the mortgagor the burden of
proving inequities to justify relief.18 These courts apply contract
principles on the theory that the due-on-sale clause is a bargain-
ed for provision in a lending contract.'8 The basic premise of this
argument is the leading authorities' definition of the modern
real estate mortgage. ' Under this definition, the mortgage is a
conveyance of an interest in property as security for perform-
ance of an obligation.88 In the cases under consideration here,
the underlying obligation is the repayment of money. Unlike a
deed, the object of the mortgage agreement is more than a con-
veyance of land. The object is to provide security for the repay-
ment of a debt."' Accordingly, the agreement sounds in contract
and the mortgagor, who has entered freely into a commercial
transaction which conditions default upon transfer without con-
sent, must accept the consequences of his bargain. Equity will
not provide him relief unless he can show inequitable conduct or
results. Proof that the mortgagee has conditioned transfer on es-
calation to the current market rate is insufficient to invoke
equitable relief.
Equity favors the mortgagee on this point for two reasons.
For discussion on this point, see text accompanying notes 45-52 supra.
18 See generally text accompanying notes 137-230 infra.
Id.
18 KRATOVIL, note 102 supra, at 35; OSBORNE, note 33 supra, § 1.
10 See also United States v. Angel, 362 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1973). There,
the court summarizes this view as follows:
When a mortgagor delivers to the mortgagee his bond and mort-
gage, the primary obligation is the debt, ie., the mortgagor's personal
undertaking to pay the debt in accordance with the provisions of the
bond. The mortgage itself is merely the collateral security for the pay-
ment of this personal obligation. The mortgagor is simply in the posi-
tion of a person who owes money to another and has given him col-
lateral as security for the payment of this obligation. See LEVIN, MORT-
GAGES AND OTHER LIENS § 72 (1961).
Id. at 447-48.
"I KRATOviL, note 102 supra, at 35; Osborne, note 44 supra, § 1.
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First, assumption at the original loan rate provides a windfall to
the mortgagor and his transferee. The mortgagor may exact a
higher selling price on property to which he can attach a low in-
terest loan. The transferee, who was not a party to the original
loan contract, reaps the benefit of the bargain without incurring
detriment. Second, this windfall threatens the mortgagee's sol-
vency, inasmuch as it forces him into a new loan agreement
which does not cover his costs.
Courts in nine states have expressed approval of the mort-
gagee's current portfolio argument and no longer condition his
recovery on a showing of impairment.192 The seminal case on this
point is Gunther v. White,193 in which the mortgagor sought to
prevent the mortgagee from conditioning consent on payment of
the higher rate. " Relying on a 1911 Tennessee case which view-
ed the note and mortgage as a contract,95 the Tennessee
Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's dismissal of the case
for failure to state a claim.199 The court acknowledged that
equity must provide relief against mortgagee oppression, but
held that "exercise of the option to gain the benefit of a current
rate" is neither unconscionable nor inequitable.1" Briefly articu-
lating the public policy argument against providing the mortga-
gor a windfall at the expense of mortgagee solvency, 9' the Tenn-
192 Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Nebraska, Wisconsin,
Washington, New York and New Jersey. For a discussion of the North Carolina
and Nebraska courts' view, see text accompanying notes 1-19 supra. Maryland
courts likely support this view. See, e.g., Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md. 42, 51, 227
A.2d 26, 31 (1967) (mortgage to which residential mortgagor and non-commercial
mortgagee are parties is "not only a security instrument, it is also a contract be-
tween the parties.").
13 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
z Id. at 530.
15 Id. at 531 (citing Lee v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 124 Tenn. 582, 139
S.W. 690 (1911)).
'" 489 S.W.2d at 532.
1 Id. at 531.
l The court reasoned that:
appellants can sell their property at a higher price if they can sell it at
the lower interest rate. The appellees under their contract have the
right to insist upon the repayment of their loan in the event of sale, so
that they can relend the money at an increased interest rate, and so
maintain their supply of lending money, at the level of their present
cost of such money. In this situation, equity should not depart from the
law which requires it to enforce valid contracts and strike down the ac-
celeration option simply because its exercise will let the appellees, not
19821
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essee court approved a rate escalation from six and one-quarter
percent to eight percent.199
Gunther set in motion the current trend in American courts.
Seven of the nine states have adopted the Gunther rationale.
The remaining states, New York and Georgia, have reached the
same result on similar grounds.
The Washington Supreme Court adopted Gunther on slight-
ly different facts in Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings &
Loan Association."' The oddities were that the note expressly
provided that the loan was "personal to" the mortgagor and that
transfer "shall be deemed to increase the risk of lender. 0 1
Transfer without consent authorized the mortgagee to acceler-
ate the loan or to condition assumption on a rate increase of up
to two percent "to compensate for such increased risk.2 °2 When
the mortgagor sold the property, Pacific First Federal invoked
the rate increase language and increased the loan rate by one-
half of one percent.2 3 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's favorable ruling on Pacific First Federal's sum-
mary judgment motion.20 ' It carefully noted the distinction be-
tween the facts in this case and those in the standard accelera-
tion clause case, but expressly adopted the Gunther rationale in
full.20 5
The supreme courts of Wisconsin 20 and New Jersey207 also
have cited Gunther with approval. These cases are noteworthy
for their peculiar application of this case. In Mutual Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Wisconsin Wire Works, the Wis-
consin court reviewed for the second time Mutual Federal's fore-
closure action against Wisconsin Wire Works and two subse-
the appellants, make the profit on the interest rate occasioned by the in-
creased cost of money.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 529.
86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
Id. at 402, 545 P.2d at 547-48.
12 Id., 545 P.2d at 547.
20 Id.
204 Id.
"0 Id. at 405, 545 P.2d at 549-50.
"' Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531,
239 N.W.2d 20 (1976).
Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. VanGlahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364
A.2d 558 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
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quent transferees pursuant to a land contract." '
In the first appeal the court had remanded for further find-
ings, holding that the standard due-on-sale clause is an unambi-
guous and enforceable contract provision which neither consti-
tutes a penalty nor offends public policy unless its exercise is in-
equitable. 9 In an intervening decision, the court clarified its
position by stating that impairment of security is only one of the
factors it will consider when balancing the equities."' Little
more than one year later in the second appeal of Wisconsin Wire
Works, the court went even further, citing Gunther with ap-
proval and including as factors both impairment of security and
rising interest rates."' As a result of this diluted application of
Gunther, however, the Wisconsin court may have confined its
reduction of lender risks to severely inflationary market
periods. 2
1 2
2 71 Wis. 2d at 432-33, 239 N.W.2d at 21-22 (1976).
Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99,
205 N.W.2d 762 (1973). The court instructed the lower court to determine on re-
mand whether the mortgagor could prove equitable defenses. 58 Wis. 2d at 112,
205 N.W.2d at 770. Finding no defenses available to this mortgagor, the trial
court granted foreclosure.
I Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Med. Serv., 66 Wis. 2d 210,
216-17, 223 N.W.2d 921, 925 (1974).
2 71 Wis. 2d at 537, 239 N.W.2d at 23.
"2l Similarly, one New Jersey court has indicated that its state court prece-
dent does not preclude consideration of whether the security was impaired. The
case is so aberrational, however, that it should not be read as a limitation on
earlier New Jersey cases which allow acceleration to maintain a current portfolio.
In Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Reider & Sons Bldg. & Dev. Co., 151 N.J. Super.
502, 377 A.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1977). Fidelity had accelerated the debt pur-
suant to a standard due-on-sale clause when Reider and Sons conveyed the
premises to Solomon Reider, its principal stockholder. Id. at 506, 377 A.2d at
692-93. While the issue was whether subsequent conveyance to the corporation
reversed the acceleration, the dictum was far reaching. The court acknowledged
that New Jersey courts consider the due-on-sale clause a valid contractual term
which must be enforced "without regard to whether the underlying purposes...
have been frustrated." Id. at 508-09, 377 A.2d at 694. Despite this acknowledge-
ment, the court proceeded to mix the contract and reasonableness theories to
justify its application of the reasonableness test. Exploring the surrounding cir-
cumstances, the court found neither impairment, nor that the parties intended
that acceleration occur absent impairment, and denied the mortgagee recovery.
The court's reasoning was as follows. The "obvious purpose" of a due-on-sale
clause is "the protection of a lender's security for an obligation and his need to
have a borrower known by him to be conscientious, experienced and able:' Id. at
508, 377 A.2d at 694. The split of authority is no more than a disagreement over
which party must bear the burden of proving impairment. Many courts require
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The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Gunther ra-
tionale in Century Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Van
Glahn. 1 First of all, the Century Federal court approved the
automatic enforcement view of the due-on-sale clause.21 4 The
court reasoned that, since the due-on-sale clause is a valid and
enforceable contractual term, the mortgagee may insist upon
"strict observance" unless his improper conduct has caused the
default."' It found that escalating the rate to obtain the benefit
of the higher current market rate is "a legitimate and reason-
able business practice" which fulfills the statutory purpose of
providing an outlet for investment and home financing.21 Fur-
ther noting the equity rationale behind Gunther,27 the court
held that "institution of a foreclosure action in order to maintain
the portfolio of the Association at current interest rates is emi-
nently proper.11
211
In an equally expansive commercial foreclosure case, Tierce
v. APS Co.,"9 the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the Gunther
rationale for both residential and commercial mortgage ac-
tions. Two years prior to Tierce, the Alabama court had decided
First Southern Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Brit-
ton,22' a suit brought by a residential mortgagor. There, the
that the mortgagor show impairment or jeopardy to the security. Other courts
tend to enforce the clause automatically "without regard to whether the underly-
ing purposes ... have been frustrated." Id. Although New Jersey has adopted the
latter view, it has not had occasion to consider cases, such as Fidelity, in which
there is no evidence of impairment. Further, even in the cases under considera-
tion, the "surrounding circumstances did not go without mention." Id. at 509, 377
A.2d at 695. Since no impairment evidence exists in this case, the court should
consider these surrounding circumstances in rendering a decision. Id.
211 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
214 Id. at 54-55, 364 A.2d at 562. Century Federal brought a foreclosure action
for enforcement of a standard due-on-sale clause when the mortgagors entered
into a land contract for sale of the property without consent. Id. at 50-51, 364 A.2d
at 560-61.
115 Id. at 51, 364 A.2d at 560.
=' "N.J.S.A. 17:12B-12 states that the purpose of a savings and loan associa-
tion is for the promotion of 'thrift, home ownership and housing or otherwise in-
vesting funds in accordance with the provisions of this act.' "Id. at 54, 364 A.2d at
561.
211 Id. at 54-55, 364 A.2d at 562.
215 Id. at 53, 364 A.2d at 561. The court also noted Shalit v. Investors Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 101 N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968), which
upheld under a standard due-on-sale clause the mortgagee's receipt of a premium
in exchange for a waiver of its acceleration privilege. Id. at 52, 364 A.2d at 560.
15 382 So. 2d at 488 (Ala. 1979), rehearing denied, 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1980).
2345 So. 2d 300 (Ct. App. 1977).
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Court of Civil Appeals reviewed a claim for recovery of sums
paid under protest to obtain the mortgagee's consent to trans-
fer. The court acknowledged the enforceability of acceleration
clauses as a bargained-for contract provision under settled
Alabama law."2 Nevertheless, it held that because the purpose
of the clause is to protect the security of the mortgagee, acceler-
ation exclusively to maintain a current portfolio "must be openly
"stated and bargained for from the inception of the contract."'
In Tierce, however, the court ignored Britton's disclosure ra-
tionale and held that upgrading the portfolio is a valid business
reason for acceleration.m
Courts in the remaining states, Georgia and New York, have
reached similar results on state statutory theory without adopt-
ing Gunther. In Barclay Arms Associations v. Midwest Federal
Savings & Loan Association, the federal district court relied on
Georgia Supreme Court enforcement of the provision as writ-
ten2 2 ' and cited a plethora of state authority for the proposition
that the mortgagee need not show impairment of his security to
recover.25
The landmark decision in New York is Stith v. Hudson City
Savings Institution.228 In a declaratory judgment action brought
by the mortgagor, the court held that the residential mortgagor
"may not compel the mortgagee to accept [the prospective pur-
chasers] as debtors and owners of the security; nor do they
become parties to the mortgage and its covenants by assuming
the obligation."'' The court grounded its decision in contract
theory and in New York General Obligations law. Under New
York case authority, an acceleration clause is a valid contractual
provision. Since the clause under consideration was unambiguous,
Hudson City validly exercised its rights by conditioning consent
to transfer upon an agreement that the rate escalate from six
Id. at 302-03, citing Tidwell v. Wittmeier, 150 Ala. 253, 43 So. 782 (1907).
345 So. 2d at 303-04.
382 So.2d at 487 (citing Tidwell v. Wittmeier, 150 Ala. 253, 43 So. 782
(1907)). See also 382 So. 2d at 488 (quoting Gunther v. White 489 S.W.2d at 532).
For full text of the quoted language see text accompanying notes 198 supra.
C 079-2245 A 6 slip op. (N.D. Ga., Aug. 20, 1980).
" Id. at 5.
63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
Id. at 865, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 807. See also Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v.
Buffalo Sav. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (mortgagee's
refusal to consent to transfer to financially responsible buyer does not constitute
inequitable conduct).
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percent to seven and one-half percent."8 The Stith court re-
jected the argument that the escalation constituted a violation
of New York law, which prohibits an increase beyond the rate
established in the initial agreement." It reasoned that, since the
statute expressly excepts escalation following obligor default,
the mortgagor cannot invoke this statute to force assumption at
the original rate.110
V. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The fourth analytical approach courts have used when faced
with a federally chartered institution's exercise of a standard
due-on-sale clause is the preemption doctrine."1 With one possi-
ble exception,12 courts have agreed that the Homeowners' Loan
Act (HOLA)2 and its companion regulations 3' for federal lend-
ing institutions preempt state laws, even though the state laws
are designed to regulate all mortgagees within the jurisdiction. 5
Without exception, those courts which have considered this issue
in the context of the standard due-on-sale clause have held that
the statutory scheme and the specific regulations covering such
clauses preempt state laws restricting mortgagee practices.36
63 Misc.2d at 865-66, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 807-8.
Id. at 866-67, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 808-9.
Id. at 867, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
21 For brief discussion of four theories see text accompanying notes 31-34
supra.
For discussion of possible exception see text accompanying notes 277-285
infra.
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 [hereinafter cited as HOLA]. Congress's express
purpose of enacting HOLA included the following:
To provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebt-
ness, to refinance home mortgages, to extend relief to the owners of
homes occupied by them and who are unable to amortize their debt
elsewhere, to amend the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, to increase the
market for obligations to the United States and for other purposes.
Pub. L. No. 43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933).
12 C.F.R. §§ 500.1-590.5 (1981).
For a listing of cases in which courts have applied the preemption doc-
trine to controversies between state and FHLBB asserted authority to regulate
federally chartered associations see text accompanying note 247 infra.
I Id. The United States Supreme Court has agreed to review a California
decision in which the state court held that federal law under the Homeowners'
Loan Act of 1933 permitting the use of due-on-sale clauses did not pre-empt state law
restricting the use of the clauses. de la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan, 121
Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S.
Jan. 26, 1982) (No. 81-750). The same issues have been presented to the Court in
Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Hehir, (unpublished opinion, Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist.,
July 7, 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982) (No.
[Vol. 84
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The first premise on which rests the preemption doctrine is
that the HOLA legislative history and language demonstrate
Congressional intent that a federal agency govern the operation
of federally chartered institutions. The legislative history is par-
ticularly helpful in this regard, disclosing grave congressional
and presidential concern over what both considered a crisis in
residential mortgage financing." This dissatisfaction, which
Congress attributed in major part to varied and unsound state
practices, culminated in 1933 in the provision for a federal net-
work of mortgages pursuant to the HOLA. 8
Read in light of this history, the statutory language unmis-
takably reveals congressional preemptive intent. Although Con-
gress might have placed regulatory responsibility on the states,
it created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)'39 to
which it delegated plenary authority. Through the capstone pro-
vision, section 1464, Congress authorized the FHLBB to charter,
supervise and regulate federal savings and loan associations24
and to enforce compliance with its regulations.14 ' It further
81-992) and in California Say. & Loan v. Tan, (unpublished opinion, Cal. Ct. App.,
4th Dist., July 7, 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. Jan. 26,
1982) (No. 81-993).
21 See T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME BANK BOARD 26 (1969). See also
Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979). See
also H.R. Doc. No. 19, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1618, 1702 (1933) (remarks by Presi-
dent Roosevelt).
2Id.
12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FHLBB. Currently, the
FHLBB is an independent agency within the executive branch.
(b) The Home Loan Bank Board which was, pursuant to Reorganization
Plan Numbered 3 of 1947 [5 USCS § 903 note], established and made a
constituent agency of the Housing and Home Finance Agency shall,
from Aug. 11, 1955, [the effective date of the Housing Amendments of
1955] cease to be such a constituent agency and shall be an independent
agency [including the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation]
in the executive branch of the Government.
12 U.S.C. § 1437(b) (1979).
240 § 1464. Federal Savings and Loan Associations (a) Organization author-
ized. In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people
may invest their funds and in order to provide for the financing of
homes, the Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it
may prescribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examina-
tion, operation, and regulation of associations to be known as "Federal
Savings and Loan Associations," and to issue charters therefore, giving
primary consideration to the best practices of local mutuil thrift and
home-financing institutions in the United States.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1979).
" (d) Proceedings to enforce compliance with law and regulations; cease
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directed that the FHLBB promulgate regulations for its member
associations with no more than "primary consideration [for] the
best practices" of state chartered institutions.2 Consequently,
without prohibiting FHLBB adoption of sound state practices,
Congress made clear its intent that the FHLBB devise uniform
and well-advised standards suitable for a network of federally
chartered institutions.4
Pursuant to its statutory charge the FHLBB has set forth
numerous lending regulations, many of which comport with
state practices."' Among these regulations is a provision which
supports the federally chartered mortgagee's inclusion and exer-
cise of the standard due-on-sale clause in residential loan con-
tracts."s Although few courts have been faced with the question
and-desist proceedings; temporary cease-and desist orders; suspension or
removal of directors or officers; appointment and removal of conser-
vator or receiver; hearings and judicial review; regulations for
reorganization, dissolutions, etc.; penalties; definitions; application to
other institutions. (1) The Board shall have power to enforce this section
and rules and regulations made hereunder.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1979).
22 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1979).
243 See Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. Ill. 1975); Kaski v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240, N.W.2d
367 (1976).
' See 12 C.F.R. §§ 500.1-590.5 (1981).
2- 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.8-3(f) and (g) (1981) state in full that:
(f) Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to have the power
to include, as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provi-
sion in its loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option,
declare immediately due and payable sums secured by the association's
security instrument if all or any part of the real property securing the
loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's
prior written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this sec-
tion with respect to loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a
home occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, exercise by the
association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be
exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights
and remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and govern-
ed by that contract.
(g) Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. With respect
to any loanmade after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied
or to be occupied by the borrower, a Federal association: (1) Shall not
exercise a due-on-sale clause because of (i) creation of a lien on other en-
cumbrance subordinate to the association's security instrument, (ii)
creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances;
(iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a
joint tenant; or (iv) granting of a leasehold interest of three years or
[Vol. 84
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of whether the FHLBB's due-on-sale provision preempts conflict-
ing state regulations,"' several courts have applied the preemp-
tion doctrine to other regulations.2 7 The overwhelming weight
of authority is that Congress intended FHLBB determinations
of "the best practic.es 28 to preempt state regulation. 9
less not containing an option to purchase; (2) shall not impose a prepay-
ment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration of the loan by exercise of
a due-on-sale clause; and (3) waives its option to exercise a due-on-sale
clause as to a specific transfer if, before the transfer, the association
and the person to whom the property is to be sold or transferred (the
existing borrower's successor in interest) agree in writing that that per-
son's credit is satisfactory to the association and that interest on sums
secured by the association's security interest will be payable at a rate
the association shall request. Upon such agreement and resultant
waiver the association shall release the existing borrower from all
obligations under the loan instruments, and the association is deemed to
have made a new loan to the existing borrower's successor in interest.
For a standard due-on-sale clause see text accompanying note 2 supra.
Although this regulation was not promulgated until 1979, 44 C.F.R. 5.7386 (Oct. 5,
1979), 5.7386 (Oct. 5, 1979), the FHLBB long has supported the use of the standard
clause. See, e.g., Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12,
16-17 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
24 See generally text accompanying notes 254-276 infra. See also Williams v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); see note supra and ac-
companying text.
247 See, e.g., First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st
Cir. 1979) (federal regulations preempt Massachusetts requirement that mort-
gagees pay interest on escrow accounts); Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979) (California Housing Financial Discrimination
Act is preempted by FHLBB regulations); Kupiec v. Repubic Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 512 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1975) (FHLBB construction of HOLA and regulations
since it is agency charged with administration and enforcement of act); Mayers v.
Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974) (FHLBB
regulation regarding prepayments to federal associations preempts state law);
Central Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 422 F.2d 504 (8th
Cir. 1970) (FHLBB regulation regarding establishment and operation of mobile
facilities for federal associations preempts state law); Rettig v. Arlington Heights
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (FHLBB approval of
federal association choice of insurance agency preempts state law); Lyons Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(FHLBB approval for federal associations to open branch officers preempts state
law); Kaski v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 267 (1976)
(FHLBB regulation of interest rate escalation clause used by federal associations
preempts state law). But see First S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn'n v. First S. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 614 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1980) (HOLA does not govern savings and loan
associations chartered by state, even if F.S.L.I.C. insured).
2- 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1979).
2"9 See Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or.
533, 577 P.2d 477, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978). For general discussion of this
case, see text accompanying notes 277-285 infra.
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In applying the preemption doctrine, these courts have
taken varied approaches. Essentially, they agree that congres-
sional "occupation of a legislative field" pursuant to a granted
power' ° renders state law inapplicable to any issue arising in
that field. 1 Alternatively, they hold that when a state regula-
tion is challenged, a court must assume that state power is not
superseded absent a showing that preemption was Congress's
"clear and manifest purpose.""2 2 With rare exception, these
courts differ only in how they support their perception of Con-
gress's "clear and manifest" preemptive intent.8
The leading state case is Kaski v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association.'" Wisconsin mortgagors brought a class ac-
tion against a federally chartered savings and loan association
for a declaration that the interest rate escalation clause in the
mortgage note was, under state law, "unconscionable [J .
vague, and invalid.15 5 Denying relief, the court found that Con-
gress had devised a comprehensive regulatory scheme through
HOLA and the authority it had delegated to the FHLBB. 56 Al-
See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943).
21 See, e.g., Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145
(9th Cir. 1974).
m See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
m The doctrine of federal preemption arises from the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution. "This Constitution, and the Law of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the Land."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In a series of cases the Supreme Court has indicated that
Congress's "clear and manifest purpose" may appear in any of five ways. Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, rehearing denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The first situation is that in which the
federal regulatory scheme is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it." 331 U.S. at 230. The
second circumstance occurs where the regulated field is one in which "the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude en-
forcement of state laws of the same subject." Id. The third situation arises when
the object of the regulation or the nature of the obligations indicate a dominant
federal interest. Id. The fourth circumstance is that in which state law so conflicts
with federal regulation that "compliance with both federal and state regulation is
a physical impossibility." 373 U.S. at 142-43. The fifth situation arises when state
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress." 312 U.S. at 67.
' 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240, N.W.2d 367 (1967).
Id. at 133, 240 N.W.2d at 369.
Id. at 136-39, 240 N.W.2d at 370-71.
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though it acknowledged that this scheme allows the states to
regulate such areas as recordation, the court held that the
states were divested of any control which would "impinge upon
the exclusivity of the Congress and the Board to set policies re-
lating to federal lending practices.' '= The court further held
that since Congress clearly had expressed the need for uniform-
ity, state regulation which affects internal operation of the fed-
eral network and which conflicts with FHLBB policies must fall
under the preemption doctrine.5
Similarly, in the leading federal case of Glendale Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Fox259 a federal district court in
California upheld the FHLBB's authority to approve the validity
and exercise of the standard due-on-sale clause by federally
chartered associations. The case arose out of a dispute over
Glendale Federal's inclusion of the clause in its loan contracts
despite California limitations on its use.2 16 Glendale- and sued
both the FHLBB and California officials, seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief.28'
In the process of granting Glendale's and the FHLBB's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment, 2 the court reviewed horn-
book law on the preemption doctrine and what it interpreted as
congressional intent behind the HOLA.6 3 Satisfied that Con-
gress intended informed FHLBB regulation of a federal network
of associations, 4 it appeared to favor preemption on two ration-
ales.2 18 The first rationale was that congressional occupation of
an entire legislative field pursuant to a granted power renders
state regulation inapplicable. 26 The second was that state regu-
lation in conflict with valid federal regulation is void.2 7 Since the
"7 Id. at 139, 240 N.W.2d at 371.
Id. at 139-42, 240 N.W.2d at 372-73. See also Rettig v. Arlington Heights
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
2 1 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
'1 Id. at 904-7. See note 236 supra and accompanying text.
2a1 Id.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 908-10.
2Ud.
m Id. at 912. The court reviewed the preemption doctrine at length without
directly tying the facts to each preemption rationale.
Id. at 907. For discussion on this point see text accompanying note 253
supra.
"I Id. at 907-08. For discussion on this point see text accompanying note 253
supra.
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FHLBB had promulgated a due-on-sale clause regulation pur-
suant to its delegated authority, the court based the rule of the
case on the second rationale. Consequently, it held that the
FHLBB due-on-sale regulation preempted conflicting California
law"' and authorized federal lending associations to employ the
standard clause.
Several federal courts have achieved like results in consider-
ing the preemptive effect of HOLA regulations. Although gener-
ally these courts have predicated their holdings on only one of
the two rationales, the overwhelming majority has favored pre-
emption.
In one case, First Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Greenwald,289 the court found no need to determine whether
Congress had occupied the field. The Massachusetts statute
which required that all mortgagees pay interest on escrow ac-
counts directly conflicted with FHLBB regulations." ° The court
held, therefore, that the Commissioner of Banks must accede to
federal preemptive control.Y71
Similarly, in Bailey v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Association,2 a federal district court approved federally char-
tered associations' exercise of the standard due-on-sale clause
following unconsented to transfer. The court acknowledged the
FHLBB's duty to consider the best state practices in formulat-
ing its regulations."' Nevertheless, it held that the decision to
approve the use of such clauses emanated from FHLBB plenary
authority to regulate federal associations. 4 Denying the mort-
gagor injunctive relief, the court based its holding on the first
enunciated Glendale rationale 25 and declined to reach the pre-
emption issue raised by conflicting state and federal
directives."
Id. at 912.
591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979).
27 Id. at 419-20.
' Id. at 425-26.
467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979).
.Id. at 1141.
7 Id.
21 Id. at 1142.
27 See also Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145
(9th Cir. 1974); Rettig v. Arlington Heights Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 405 F. Supp.
819 (C.D. Ill 1975); People v. Coal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,.98 F. Supp. 311, 318-20
(S.D. Cal. 1951); Cf. Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d 477, cert denied, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978); Kaski v. First Fed.
I
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The one strikingly dissimilar opinion is Derenco, Inc. v. Ben-
jamin Franklin Federal Savings & Loan Association.27 There,
Oregon mortgagors brought a class action against a federally
chartered association for an accounting of funds maintained in
tax and insurance payment reserve accounts.nB In an express at-
tempt to accommodate both state and federal law,n9 the Oregon
Supreme Court stated that detailed federal regulations alone do
not invoke the preemption doctrine."o It was reasoned that
where a court finds that state law "has an effect in an area out-
side the thrust of the federal enactment," it may uphold the
state regulation subject to three qualifications.28' State regula-
tions must fall when they "actually conflict" with the federal
regulation, when they "interfere with federal purposes," or
when "Congress or the federal regulatory body unmistakably in-
dicates" an intent that federal law preempt state law.n2 Without
explanation, the court apparently found each qualification inap-
posite. Instead, it held that regulatory control of these accounts
is not an area in which uniformity is so critical that federal law
must control exclusively. 3 Consequently, federal law does not
preempt this aspect of the state's regulatory power."4
Despite the Derenco court's holding on the issue of reserve
accounts, the case can be construed in a way fully consonant
with the majority view. The court's rationale supports a pre-
diction that the Oregon court would uphold FHLBB exclu-
sive authority to approve the inclusion and exercise of due-on-
sale clauses in federal associations' loan contracts. Any state
regulation which forbade the inclusion of due-on-sale clauses by
federal associations, or limited the mortgagee's exercise of such
clauses, would "actually conflict" with federal regulations and
thus fall.28
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 72 Wis. 2d 132, 240 N.W.2d 367 (1976). For a general discus-
sion of Derenco, see text accompanying notes 277-285 infra.
I 281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d 477 (1978).
'7 Id. at 535-37, 577 P.2d at 480-81.
7 Id. at 538-39, 577 P.2d at 482-83.
Id., 577 P.2d at 483.
231 Id. at 540, 577 P.2d at 483-84.
2U Id. at 540-42, 577 P.2d at 484-85.
1 Id. at 548, 577 P.2d at 487.
... Id at 548-49, 577 P.2d at 487-88. See also note 236 supra and accompany-
ing text.
"8 For federal regulations concerning the due-on-sale clause, see text accom-
panying note 245 supra.
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Given the courts' unanimous agreement on this point, feder-
ally chartered savings and loan associations need consider only
FHLBB limitations and solvency goals in determining whether
to include the standard due-on-sale clause in residential loan con-
tracts. In a severely inflationary market, the goals of solvency
may further dictate the federally chartered associations' exer-
cise the clause solely to escalate loan rates to current market
levels. Barring a major change in FHLBB regulations, federal
mortgagees should be free to maintain current portfolios by
denying assumptions at original loan rates, despite disapproval
by state statute or regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The burgeoning growth of the savings and loan industry has
increased the availability to the public of residential financing.
While economic hard times serve to winnow out less efficient
producers within most markets, such a rejoinder cannot account
for the dilemma currently facing the savings and loan industry.
Committed to the dual purposes of encouraging thrift and pro-
viding consumer access to home ownership, these institutions
have attempted to operate with inexpensive dollars. Persis-
tently high levels of inflation, and a concomitant increased de-
mand for short-term, higher yield investments, however, have
eroded their financial position.
Additionally, the reluctance of many courts to recognize this
dilemma in the face of superficially attractive consumer argu-
ments has essentially locked these institutions into a downward
slide. In failing to join the trend of viewing the standard due-on-
sale clause as a bargained-for contract provision between the
mortgagor and mortgagee, these courts are forcing most thrift
institutions into an unhappy choice between receivership and
the federal government. The rational alternative, as presented
by the trend, decries this purely reflexive response as being
without foundation in either legal or socio-economic theory.
More importantly, it converts a no-win result into one that is
productive and just for both lenders and borrowers.
[Vol. 84
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